Tanks, personnel carriers and artillery required different maintenance parts and services. Branch units occupied their own barracks. There were problems integrating them in garrison and training. Artillery and artillerymen were always present in infantry battalions in the form of mortars, direct-fire cannon and antitank rifles.ĭuring the Cold War, the Soviets realised that combined arms units were more effective than integrating branch units just before the fight. During the Second World War, the Soviets fought primarily with separate infantry, armour and artillery units that occasionally fought as combined arms units, but usually integrated shortly before the battle. Their focus was on speed, manoeuvre, the ability to mass fires and forces, and the interaction of these forces to achieve a combined combat power greater than the component parts. The Russian Civil War (1917–1923) included raiding groups, forward detachments, rear guards, advance guards and other mobile battalions comprised of horse cavalry, machinegun detachments mounted on horse-drawn carts, horse-drawn artillery, and occasional tanks or armoured cars. The BTG is not a new feature in Russian military thought. It is likely that some BTGs will be subordinated to regiments/brigades that they are not otherwise affiliated with, and possibly to different branches, including the naval infantry and airborne troops (VDV), if expedient. They are either being spun off a parent regiment/brigade for a particular mission (such as forward detachments, advance guards, raiding detachments, flank guards, or urban assault detachments) or may be entirely independent. The brigade/regiment may now be the primary unit of manoeuvre, but some independent BTGs likely remain in play. The BTG was ideal for earlier fighting in support of separatist ethnic Russian elements in Donetsk and Luhansk however, large-scale combat requires large-scale combined arms operations and battalions fighting as part of larger entities. Although the Russians appear to be having difficulties, this structural change was likely envisioned from the beginning of the operation, as the scale of the conflict is unsuitable for the sole use of independent BTGs. Larger formations have apparently deployed only with their BTGs, leaving their other manoeuvre battalions in garrisons. Though understanding of the invasion is still in its infancy, this article intends to shed some light on what a BTG is, and how it is used in a Russian military context.Īt the time of writing, details are still sketchy, but based upon media reports and a few captured Russian maps, it appears that Russia has conducted a partial mobilisation, deploying only partial divisions/regiments, brigades, and independent BTGs. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has made the term ‘Battalion Tactical Group’ commonplace beyond the expert community, from the mass media to YouTube and a plethora of blog sites. Traditionally, Russia’s lowest echelons capable of performing combined arms tasks were the regiment or brigade, but experimentation in the 1980s led to a semi-permanent combined arms formation at the battalion level, the Battalion Tactical Group (BTG). The execution of these tasks depends upon the enemy’s composition, position and probable course of action the position and condition of one’s own subordinate, attached and supporting units the conditions of the area on which the assigned tasks will occur and weather. Only these units, in cooperation with other branches of arms and other military services, can perform the full spectrum of defensive and offensive tasks. However, the most important determinants of victory are the actions of combined arms units. Success in modern conventional warfare is determined by a combination of effort, environment and – to an extent – luck.
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